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This paper investigates conditions for equilibrium determinacy un-
der inﬂation-targeting interest-rate rules when the basic new Keyne-
sian model is extended to incorporate real wage rigidity. I show that
the introduction of real wage rigidity increases the determinacy region
under forward-looking rules. Moreover, the Taylor principle continues
to ensure equilibrium uniqueness under current-looking rules.
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Equilibrium determinacy is an important issue for monetary policy design.
Monetary policy rules can be destabilizing, leading to multiple equilibria in
which non-fundamental shocks can inﬂuence aggregate dynamics. To avoid
this outcome, the Taylor principle, which prescribes that the interest rate
should increase by more than the increase in inﬂation, is considered an im-
portant feature of a sound monetary policy. Lubik and Marzo (2007) pro-
vide additional determinacy conditions for the basic new Keynesian dynamic
model under diﬀerent monetary policy rules.
The basic model has been extended to incorporate additional features,
but real rigidity was not systematically studied until recently. Blanchard
and Galí (2007) consider a model with an admittedly ad hoc form of real
imperfection in which real wages respond sluggishly to economic conditions.
They show that real wage rigidity generates a natural trade-oﬀ between sta-
bilizing inﬂation and the output gap, and thus having important implications
for inﬂation persistence and the propagation of shocks.
This paper examines determinacy conditions in the Blanchard and Galí
(2007) extension of a basic new Keynesian model. The analysis focus on
inﬂation-targeting interest-rate rules, without a feedback on the output gap. I
1show that the Taylor principle is a necessary condition for determinacy. If the
central bank responds to current inﬂation, it is also a suﬃcient condition. The
presence of real wage rigidity imposes an upper bound for the reactiveness
of the interest rate under forward-looking rules. This upper bound is an
increasing function of the index of real wage rigidity, allowing the central bank
to react more strongly to expected inﬂation as real wage rigidity becomes
more important. A lower bound is still given by the Taylor principle.
2 The Model
The model features nominal price rigidity and a partial adjustment mecha-
nism for real wages.
Households with a time-separable utility and a discount factor β maximize
their expected lifetime utility given a sequence of budget constraints. The












where Ct and Nt are consumption and employment, respectively.
After imposing market clearing conditions, the log-linear form of the Euler
2equation is:
yt = Et(yt+1) −
1
σ
[it − Et(πt+1)]. (1)
Firms in a monopolistic competitive environment produce diﬀerentiated
goods with a linear technology using only labor. Price decisions are described
by the Calvo mechanism, where θ is the fraction of ﬁrms not adjusting their
price in a given period. In the neighborhood of a zero-inﬂation steady state,
inﬂation dynamics is described by the new Keynesian Phillips curve:




The variables yt, it, πt and wt are output, the nominal interest rate,
inﬂation and real wages, respectively, all expressed in log-deviations from
their steady states. Note that, owing to the technology used, real marginal
costs are equivalent to real wages in log-linear form.
A partial adjustment mechanism for real wages is incorporated to intro-










where Wt and Pt are the nominal wage and price. MRSt is the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and employment. The parameter
γ is the index of real wage rigidity, summarizing the eﬀects of friction in the
labor market that are not explicitly modeled.
In log-linear form, after imposing market clearing conditions, real wage
dynamics is given by:
wt = γwt−1 + (1 − γ)(σ + ϕ)yt. (3)
The parameters k, σ and ϕ are strictly positive, with 0 < β < 1 and
0 < γ < 1.
Equations (1), (2) and (3) constitute a log-linear approximation of the
model. To close the system, a monetary policy rule is needed.
3 Inﬂation targeting and determinacy
In the analysis of equilibrium determinacy, I focus on pure inﬂation-targeting
rules for two basic reasons. First, it is important to study such rules since they
4are simple and transparent, acting as a benchmark for more sophisticated
interest-rate rules. Second, there are problems associated with the choice of
an appropriate measure for the output gap in Taylor rules. Some of these
problems are discussed in Orphanides(2003).
It is assumed that the central bank follows two types of interest-rate rules:
it = αππt, (4)
it = απEtπt+1, (5)
where απ is strictly positive.
Equations (4) and (5) describe a current-looking and a forward-looking
rule, respectively,.
Equilibriumdeterminacy conditions are summarized in the following propo-
sitions.
Proposition 1 Under current-looking rules, the necessary and suﬃcient con-
dition for a rational-expectations equilibrium to be determinate is that:
απ > 1. (6)
5Proof. First, I eliminate the interest rate using (4) and rewrite the log-linear
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The characteristic equation of A is:
P(λ) = λ
3 + A2λ
2 + A1λ + A0 = 0.
Determinacy requires that one root of the equation is inside the unit circle
and two roots are outside. Following Woodford (2003), this occurs if and only
if:
either (case I)
61 + A2 + A1 + A0 < 0
and
−1 + A2 − A1 + A0 > 0,
or (case II)
1 + A2 + A1 + A0 > 0,




0 − A0A2 + A1 − 1 > 0,
or (case III)
1 + A2 + A1 + A0 > 0,
−1 + A2 − A1 + A0 < 0,
A
2
0 − A0A2 + A1 − 1 < 0
7and
|A2| < 3.
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Since −1 + A2 − A1 + A0 < 0, case I can be ruled out. In cases II and
III, 1 + A2 + A1 + A0 > 0. This condition can be reduced to (6), which is a
necessary condition for equilibrium determinacy.
The additional conditions for determinacy are A2
0 − A0A2 + A1 − 1 > 0































(1 − γ)(σ + ϕ) + (γ − β) > 0. (8)
Equilibrium is determinate if and only if the parameters of the model
satisfy (6) and either (7) or (8). I show that (6) is both necessary and
suﬃcient for determinacy. This claim is proved by showing that any set of
parameter values satisfying (6) but not (8) must necessarily satisfy (7).
Since 1
β + β − 2 > 0 and the second term is strictly positive, (8) will not
hold only if β > γ.
If β > γ, then
γ
β − 1 < 0 and
γ
β − γ − 1














Therefore, condition (7) will hold if απ −
γ
β > 0. This is the case since,
απ > 1 and
γ
β < 1 imply that απ > 1 >
γ
β. This last step completes the proof
and (6) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy.
9Proposition 2 Under forward-looking rules, the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for a rational-expectations equilibrium to be determinate is that:








Proof. Under forward-looking rules, A becomes:
A =
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10Again, case I can be ruled out, since conditions 1+A2+A1+A0 < 0 and
−1 + A2 − A1 + A0 > 0 lead to the following contradiction:
2(1 + γ)(1 + β)
β









In cases II and III, 1+A2 +A1 +A0 > 0. This condition can be reduced
to (9), which is a necessary condition for equilibrium determinacy.
The additional conditions for determinacy are A2
0 − A0A2 + A1 − 1 > 0
































| < 3. (11)
Equilibrium is determinate if and only if the parameters of the model
satisfy (9) and either (10) or (11). I show that (9) is both necessary and
suﬃcient for determinacy. This claim is proved by showing that any set of
11parameter values satisfying (9) but not (11) must necessarily satisfy (10).























−3 < 0, then 1
β +β −2+γ −β < 0. This inequality holds
only if β > γ, given that 1
β + β − 2 > 0.














(1 − γ)( 1
β − 1) > 0.
Since (9) is satisﬁed,
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This last step completes the proof.
According to Propositions 1 and 2, monetary policy should be active when
real wage rigidity is present, following the Taylor principle. Under forward-
looking rules, a monetary policy should not be excessively active. This result
is also true for the basic new Keynesian model in which γ = 0. Since
1+γ
1−γ > 1
and increases in γ, the central bank can be more aggressive as real wage
rigidity becomes more important, without destabilizing aggregate dynamics.
If γ → 1, the Taylor principle, restriction (3), is restored as a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for determinacy.
In the basic new Keynesian model, an excessive response to inﬂation
expectations can lead to a deep recession and cause deﬂation, destabilizing
the economy. In a model with real wage rigidity, πt is less sensitive to yt
and a much stronger recession is needed to induce deﬂation. Therefore, the
13determinacy region is increased and monetary authorities are less restricted
in taking an active approach.
4 Conclusion
In a new Keynesian model with real wage rigidity, I show that an active
monetary policy is a necessary condition for equilibrium determinacy un-
der current-looking and forward-looking inﬂation-targeting rules. Therefore,
the Taylor principle continues to be an important recommendation for the
design of simple monetary policy rules after the introduction of real imper-
fections. Furthermore, the determinacy region is increased under forward-
looking rules, allowing the central bank to respond more strongly to inﬂation
expectations as the importance of real wage rigidity increases.
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